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MOORE, MARVIN L. Ph.D. Sex Roles and Moral Reasoning: The 
Relationship Between Moral Orientation and the Social Domain. 
(1988) Directed by Dr. Sarah Shoffner. 80 pp. 
One purpose of the study was to examine the suggestion about 
moral reasoning put forth by Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986) that there 
are two perspectives of a moral dilemma which are gender related. 
The second purpose was to extend current knowledge about the 
relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation by 
moving away from the much studied psychological measures of sex 
roles and concentrating on the sociological measures of social 
conventions and decision-making in the societal domain (Turiel, 
1978). 
SUbjects were 87 graduate student volunteers from two states in 
the eastern u.s. Fifty-two females and 35 males were in the 
sample. All of the females and all but two of the males were white. 
Data were collected using four questionnaires. Analysis of the data 
showed the sample to be high in moral maturity, "modern" in sex-role 
orientation, and to place a strong emphasis on both the "rights" and 
"care" moral orientations. 
Three null hypotheses were proposed to test Gilligan's (1977, 
1982, 1986) theorizing. Data analysis revealed no support for a 
difference between men and women on their use of the two moral 
orientations and some support for a relationship between moral 
maturity and moral orientation. There was no difference between men 
and women on level of moral maturity. 
Six null hypotheses were proposed to test sex-role, 
researcher's notions and to examine the relationships among 
moral orientation, moral maturity, and decision-making in the 
societal domain. The results showed no difference between men 
and women on sex-role orientation, a significant relationship 
between moral maturity and sex-role orientation, no relationship 
between moral maturity and decisioning about sex-role 
orientation, a significant relationship between moral orientation 
and sex-role orientation, and no relationships between moral 
orientation or sex and decisioning about sex-role orientation. 
Implications for moral reasoning research and sex-role research were 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTIOO AND REVIE.W OF LITERATURE 
Recently much attention has been given the possible 
relationships between gender and moral reasoning. Following 
Kohlberg' s ( 1966) suggestion that sex role and moral development 
parallel cognitive development, many studies have examined the links 
between sex-role self-concept, as measured by psychological scales 
such as Bern's Sex Role Inventory, and stage of moral reasoning, as 
defined by Kohlberg (e.g., Leahy & Either, 1980; Pratt & Royer, 
1982; Pratt, Golding & HWlter, 1984). They generally suggest a 
change from stereotypic sex-role beliefs to an integration of sex 
roles (androgyny) as one moves toward the postconventional or 
principled level of moral reasoning. 
Some of these and other studies (Pratt & Royer, 1982; Pratt, 
Golding, & Hunter, 1984), have also examined the relationship 
between moral orientation, as defined by Kohlberg's 11 rights;justice 11 
and Gilligan's "care/responsibility11 modes, and sex-role self-
concept. These studies have generally shown complex and 
inconsistent patterns of relationships between these variables. 
Still another approach has been to concentrate on the 
relationship between moral orientation and self-concept (Gilligan, 
1982, Lyons, 1983; Ford & LOWery, 1986). Findings from these 
studies suggest a connection between modes of defining the self and 
modes of decision-making in the moral domain. In short, researchers 
have tried to ascertain whether those who view themselves from 
Kohlberg's "justice/rights'' orientation and those who view 
themselves from Gilligan's "care/responsibility" orientation will 
approach decisions in the moral domain in a manner consistent with 
these perspectives. 
As this summary suggests, current research has concentrated on 
the psychological dimension of sex-role beliefs and decision-making 
in the moral domain. Sex roles have generally been defined by 
looking at psychological personality traits. Little attention, 
however, has been given to sex-role preferences as defined by 
sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in 
the societal domain. The current study was an attempt to explore 
these areas. The focus was on the possible relationships among 
level of moral maturity and mode of moral orientation, as defined by 
Kohlberg and Gilligan, and sex-role preferences in the societal 
domain (Turiel, 1978). 
Gilligan has taken issue with the reasoning behind Kohlberg's 
(197lb) suggestion that women typically fall in stage three (good 
defined as what is pleasing to and approved of by others) of his six 
stages of moral development, whereas men typically are found at 
stage four (law and order). Kohlberg did not believe this situation 
to be the result of innate differences between men and women. 
Rather, he believed it to be the result of women not being allowed 
the same level of social participation that men have enjoyed. 
Gilligan agreed that, given equal social experiences, men and women 
will reach ~rable levels of moral developaent. She asserted, 
however, that women are judged mfairly by Kohlberg•s theory of 
moral development~ This happens, she suggested, because women, as a 
result of the socialization process, tend to use a different 
approach when solving moral dile11111as. Gilligan has suggested that 
women are judged to be on a lower level of moral reasoning because 
they use a moral orientation based on a concern for the welfare of 
others and an emphasis on maintaining personal relationships, rather 
than the concern for "justice" identified by Kohlberg as the 
universal principle of morality. 
A specific purpose of the study was to examine these 
suggestions about moral reasoning put forth by Gilligan ( 1977, 1982, 
1986). Rather then defining stages, as is the result of Kohlberg•s 
interview technique, moral maturity was defined as a continuous 
variable ranging from "low" to "high~" Moral orientation, or the 
overall approach one takes in solving moral dilemmas, was defined as 
either the concern for "justice" and ''rights" described by Kohlberg, 
or the concern for "care" and "responsibility" defined by Gilligan~ 
It was measured using responses to hypothetical moral dilenanas. 
A second purpose was to extend current knowledge about the 
relationship between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation by 
moving away frau the 11111ch studied psychological measures of sex 
roles and concentrating on the sociological measures of social 
conventions and decision-making in the societal domain (TUriel, 
1978). The social convention of sex-roles was defined by examining 
responses to statements about desired behavior for men and women. 
The responses were placed on a scale ranging from "traditional" to 
"modern." Decision-making in the societal domain was defined by 
analyzing responses to statements about the roles of men and women 
in society. The responses were analyzed for the moral orientation 
used in making decisions about the desired behaviors for men and 
women. 
Theories of Moral Reasoning 
The dominant theory of moral reasoning originated with Piaget 
(1928) and was further developed by Kohlberg (e.g., 1981) over a 
period of more than twenty years. The theory describes the process 
of moral development as one of moving through stages that are 
sequential, invariant, irreversible, and universaL In his view, 
all people move, to varying degrees, through six stages of moral 
development that represent three perspectives of morality. 
In the preconventional stages, morality is based on obedience 
of author! ty and adherence to rules in an effort to avoid punistunent 
or to make fair deals in terms of social agreements. In the 
conventional stage, law and socially constructed rules become the 
guide for moral behavior. The emphasis is on playing a good (nice) 
role or doing one's duty to society. In the highest level, the 
postconventional or principled stages, morality as social convention 
is replaced by a reflective understanding of human rights. The 
individual is able to look back and analyze social convention from 
his/her own individual perspective. It implies the recognition that 
ethical principles may exist outside social convention. 
In Kohlberg's view, movement through the six stages is the 
result of a working out of solutions to the many moral dilemmas one 
faces. A moral dilermna is defined as any situation involving two or 
more people with competing claims or conflicting rights. Moral 
development is defined as: 
• • • the expanding conception of the social world as 
it is reflected in the understanding and resolution 
of the inevitable conflicts that arise in the 
relations between the self and others. The moral 
judgement is a statement of priority, an attempt at 
rational resolution. {Gilligan, 1977, p. 483) 
In all of this system the core of principled morality is seen 
as "justice.•• Kohlberg {1981) suggested that even though other 
concerns are present at lower stages of reasoning (role-taking and 
empathy), only justice "takes on the character of a principle at the 
highest stage of development • • • and takes precedence over law and 
other considerations, including welfare" {p. 176). 
From this perspective, morality can be seen as a state of 
"knowing what is right" or "what should be done.•• Morality thus 
becomes "a discrete moment of rational choosing 11 (Lyons, 1983, 
p. 132). It is a syctem of morality that gives the individual, and 
individualism, the highest priority. In further describing 
morality, Rest {1986} developed a four-component model. He 
suggested that for the person to behave "morally" at least four 
psychological processes must have been performed: 
1. The person must have been able to make some sort 
of int~rp.retation of the particular situation in 
terms of what actions were possible, who 
(including oneself) would be affected by each 
course of action, and how the interested parties 
would regard such effects on their welfare. 
2. The person ImlSt have been able to make a 
judgement about which course of action was 
morally right (or fair or just or morally good), 
thus labeling one possible line of action as what 
a person ought (morally ought) to do in that 
situation. 
3. The person must give priority to moral values 
above other personal values such that a decision 
is made to intend to do what is morally right. 
4. The person must have sufficient perseverance, 
ego strength, and implementation skills to be 
able to follow through on his/her intention to 
behave morally, to withstand fatigue and flagging 
will, and to overcome obstacles. (p. 3-4) 
Kohlberg developed his theory from a longitudinal study of a 
group of boys. Since other researchers have suggested different 
approaches to morality by women (Piaget, 1966; Freud, 1925; Erikson, 
1968), the absence of females in Kohlberg' s work has produced 
questions as to the theory's adequacy for representing the complete 
picture of human morality (Gilligan, 1977; Golding & Laidlaw, 1979; 
Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984). Much of the debate has focused on 
whether women are judged fairly by Kohlberg' s scoring S"j'Stem. 
Recently, Gilligan ( 1977, 1982) proposed a different view of 
the perceived problem. While noting that Kohlberg's theory 
adequately illuminated a view of morality based on "justice," she 
suggested that it failed to capture a second possible perspective 
based on "care and responsibility." Through three studies of 
women's decision-making, Gilligan found support for a connection 
between one's self-concept and morality. She suggested that 
Kohlberg' s principle of "justice" was based on a concept of self as 
separate and autonomous: whereas, a self-concept based on a sense of 
connectedness and an emphasis on relationships, produced a second 
view of morality as "care and respmsibility." unlike Kohlberg's 
image of the moral individual standing alone at a discrete moment of 
rational choosing, Gilligan's orientation produces an alternative 
image of someone aware of and connected to others. In this image, 
morality becomes a type of consciousness. It is an ethical 
perspective that suggests that "self and others will he treated as 
of equal worth, that despite differences in power things will be 
fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, 
that no one will be left out or hurt• (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63). 
TwO Perspectives of Moral Dilemmas 
Gilligan ( 1986) suggested that the 11justice" and "care" 
orientations are, in reality, two perspectives on morality that can 
be located in the developing child • s awareness of self in relation 
to others. She thinks the two perspectives to be present in males 
and females and to he shaped by two dimensions of the child's early 
relationships with others. First, a dimension of inequality that is 
reflected in the child • s awareness of being smaller and less capable 
than those around hiJ!Vber. Second, a dimension of attachment that 
is reflected in the child's awareness of having the capacity to care 
for, and to be cared for by, others. According to Gilligan, it is 
through the socialization of the child that these two perspectives 
develop. An emphasis, through socialization, on the first dimension 
produces a moral orientation focusing on the striving for equality 
or "justice," whereas an emphasis on the second dimension develops a 
moral orientation based on concern for others or "care." 
Although Gilligan (1982) called the two perspectives 
"differences of theme'' rather than differences by sex, she went on 
to suggest that among men the "rights/justice" perspective is 
dominant, while the "care/responsibility" perspective is more 
characteristic of women's thinking. Lyons (1983) described the 
distinction as follows: 
In contrast to the man's notion of morality - as 
"having a reason," "a way of knowing what's right, 
what one ought to do" - is the woman's sense of 
morality as a type of "consciousness, •• "a 
sensitivity" incorporating an injunction not to 
endanger or hurt other people. (p. 126) 
From this research, then, two distinct modes of reasoning or ways of 
making moral choices have been defined. Each of these "moral 
orientations" can be defined as a "global framework or perspective 
for organizing and understanding the moral domain, •• and should be 
seen as being ''conceptionally independent of level of moral 
reasoning" (Walker, 1986, p. 115). 
Following Gilligan's writings, researchers have examined both 
sex differences in moral level attainment and sex differences in 
modes of moral reasoning. Most recent studies have shown little 
difference in the stage levels obtained by women and men (Brabeck, 
1983; Kohlberg, 1982; walker, 1984). In Walker's article, for 
example, 108 studies that, in various ways, examined the purported 
sex-bias in Kohlberg' s scoring of moral reasoning stage level were 
reviewed. This survey found only eight studies that supported the 
notion that women systematically scored on a lower level of 
reasoning than men on Kohlberg's scale. Walker concluded from his 
review that there was no support for a sex bias in Kohlberg' s 
theory. 
These findings do not, however, preclude possible sex 
differences in modes of reasoning rather than stage level attainment 
differences. For example, Walker (1984) made it clear that even 
though men and women could be judged to be on the same level of 
moral reasoning, this did not preclude possible differences in the 
content of their reasoning within the stage levels. Support for the 
differences in content of moral reasoning has been found by many 
researchers. 
Coleman ( 1980) studied sex differences in conflict resolution 
with female authority figures. Testing 56 lOth to 12th graders, she 
concluded that although conflict resolution for males and females 
follows a cognitive developmental sequence, there are also notable 
differences in the approaches to conflict resolution used by the two 
sexes. 
Using a modified form of Rest's Defining Issues Test, Pratt and 
Royer (1982) examined sex and sex role patterns in moral reasoning. 
Modifying the Defining Issues Test to produce a score corresponding 
to either a ''rights" or "responsibility" orientation, the 
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researchers found that women with more traditionally feminine ideal 
self-concepts were ID)re likely to respond to ID)ral problems from a 
"responsibility" orientation. The study addftionally supported a 
stronger link between moral reasoning and psychological sex role 
than between moral reasoning and sex. 
Lyons (1983) studied the relationship between self-concept, in 
terms of "rights" or ••responsibility" and morality. She used a five 
part, open-ended interview to collect data on mdes of self-
definition and modes of response to real-life moral choices. The 
study first revealed that, in describing themselves, women more 
frequently used a connected self orientation, while men JliDre 
frequently used characteristics of a separate/objective self. It 
should be noted, however, that these characteristics were not 
exclusive. Some men and women used elements of either mode in 
describing themselves, thus supporting Gilligan's (1982) claim that 
the two orientations are one of theme and not exclusively by sex. 
Lyons next examined the relationship between ID)des of self-
conception and modes of moral choices. Again, in support of 
Gilligan, she found that: 
••• regardless of sex, individuals who 
characterized themselves predominantly in cormected 
terms more frequently used considerations of response 
in constructing and resolving real-life DDral 
conflictS I and individuals who characterized 
themselves predominanUy in separate/objective terms 
more frequently used considerations of rights. 
(p. 141) 
Using Kohlberg's standard interview measure, Pratt, Golding, 
and Hunter ( 1984) also examined the connection between moral 
11 
judgements and moral orientation. The authors found, in support of 
Gilligan, that "for both sexes, a moderate level of self-perceived 
agency is linked to certain individual difference factors in moral 
judgement orientation" (p. 337). They also found no differences in 
moral orientation ootil individuals reached the principled, 
postconventional stage. The authors suggested that "sex differences 
in moral orientation may emerge only following the reflective 
examination of one's moral judgement patterns that accompanies 
transition to the principled stage" (p. 335). 
Ford and Lowery ( 1986) used self report questionnaires on moral 
dilemmas to get at the relationship between sex and moral 
orientation. In place of the commonly used standardized dilemmas, 
the subjects were questioned about self-selected moral dilemmas. In 
support of Gilligan's ideas, the authors found that the care 
orientation was a consistent consideration for women, and the 
justice orientation a consistent consideration for men. 
Moral Reasoning and Self concept 
Another area of study has been the relationship between level 
of moral reasoning and psychological sex role self-concept (ideas 
about masculinity and femininity). Researchers in this area have 
suggested that one's view of one's self, in terms of sex roles, will 
change as the ability to reason morally develops. Leahy and Either 
(1980), for example, examined these relationships. Using Rest's 
Defining Issues Test, they tested 116 respondents from 13 - 20 
years of age. Although the results were more consistent for females 
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than fer males, the study supported a comecticn between the two 
concepts. Generally, these at higher levels of moral reasoning 
(1110re principled) were 1110re androgynous in their sex role self-
concept. The results of this study and ethers (Pratt, Golding, & 
Htmter, 19841 Breck's, 19731 Robinson & Green, 1981) in:licate that 
"subjects giving greater etlphasis to post-conventional moral 
judgments have self-images that are more related to universal role-
independent qualities and less determined by conventional 
stereotypes of sex roles" (Leahy & Either, 1980, p. 369). 
Taken together these studies show several interesting 
relationships among moral reasoning, moral orientation, and sex role 
self-concept: 
1. Not much support has been found fer a difference in the 
moral stage levels attained by males and females. Interestingly, 
'rhcma (cited in Rest, 1986), in a meta and secondary analysis of 56 
studies using the Defining Issues Test, found that, in contrast to 
assertions by Gilligan and others, females consistently scored 
higher than males. It should be noted, however, that the size of 
the difference was smell enough to be considered inconsequential • 
. ~. SUpport fer a consistent relationship between level of 
moral maturity and psychological sex role· self-concept has been 
found. 'lbese studies indicate a movement towards less conventional 
psychological sex role beliefs (androgyny) as one moves upward 
through the levels of moral reasoning as elaborated by Kchlberg and 
Gilligan. It seems that as one leaves the conventional level of 
13 
reasoning and moves into the post-conventional level, thinking about . 
sex roles is more loosely tied to the conventional beliefs of 
society and more open to the individual's own interpretation of the 
social convention. 
3. Much support has been found for the two distinct modes of, 
or approaches to, moral reasoning. 'Itlese studies have supported 
Gilligan's notion that two n:des of reasoning exist, one based on a 
concern for individualism and justice and another based on a sense 
of connectedness and care for others and relationships, and that 
these modes cut across levels of moral reasoning. Although 
Gilligan and others have tied these two orientations to males and 
females, the research seems to indicate that, as Gilligan (1982) 
suggested, the differences are one of theme and not sex. In 
describing their own findings Ford and Lowery (1986) put it this 
way: 
'rhough this study indicates there may in fact ba same 
differences in the mral orientations of men and women, the 
investigator agrees with Brabeck that Gilligan's significant 
contribution may not be in suggesting that men and women differ 
in their orientations to moral conflict, but in broadening our 
definition of what constitutes an adequate description of the 
I!Dral reasoning process. (p. 783) 
In her 1983 study described earlier, LJIOilS, in accordance with 
previous conclusions, found support for differences in male/female 
uses of the two moral orientations and a comection between moral 
orientation and decision-making in the moral domain. She went on to 
suggest that "research is needed to test the possibility that 
14 
patterns of decision-making in areas other than moral choice may 
also be related to these Jllldes of self-definition" (p. 141). 
Moral Reasoning and sex Roles 
As suggested by the studies cited above, much is known about 
moral orientation and the relationship between moral reasoning and 
psychological sex roles, but little emphasis has been placed on sex 
roles as behavioral expectations or social conventions. The present 
study was an attempt to follow Lyon's suggestion and extend the 
knowledge into this area, decision-making in the societal domain. 
The specific concern here, in light of the research presented, 
was the relationships among level of moral maturity, mral 
orientation, and sex-role preferences in the societal domain. 
Following the work of many sex role researchers (e.g. Scanzoni, 
1975; Tomeh, 1978; Osmond & Martin, 1975), sex-role preferences 
were defined as variables that "indicate the strength with which 
actors prefer the sets of rewards and costs that flow from current 
patterns of gender stratification and division of labor" (Scanzoni 
& Fox, 1980, p. 744). 
These researchers have generally described sex-role preferences 
as falling on a scale ranging from "modem" to "traditicnal." The 
definition of these is typified by Scanzoni (1975) in a description 
of how the wife's preferences were IIV!asured: 
Greater role Jllldernity is indicated or defined as 
stronger preferences for the wife's individualistic 
interests. Role traditionalism is defined as weaker 
preferences for wife's individualistic benefits and, 
instead, greater concern for the interests of husband 
and children (or familistic interests). (p. 131) 
Taking this approach, possible connections emerged among sex-
role preferences, mode of moral orientation, and level of moral 
maturity. In describing Tomeh' s reasoning about her scale, Smith 
and Bonar (1984) stated: "The moral stance was that 
'nontraditional' was higher moral thinking because it reflected 
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flexibility and role-sharing. It also reflected equal significance 
of wife, husband, and children" (p. 10). In essence, "modernity," 
defined by Tomeh as concern for individualistic interests, appeared 
to be aligned with Kohlberg's principled level of moral reasoning 
and with Kohlberg's emphasis on the "rights/justice" perspective. 
At the same time, "traditionalism, 11 defined as prescribed roles with 
the male as automatic head, appeared to be aligned with Kohlberg' s 
mid-range stages of conventional law abiding. However, when 
studying it from a different perspective, individualistic interests 
could be a lower level of moral reasoning if concern for others was 
not also a part of the decision. 
In a series of recent studies, '1\lriel (1978) presented a 
different view of the relationship between sex-role preferences and 
moral reasoning. Making a distinction between morality and social 
convention, he suggested three distinct domains in which all people 
operate. Describing the developing child, he characterized the 
domains thus: 
The psychological domain refers to the child's 
developing concepts of the person (self and other), 
for example, causes and predictions of behavior., 
identity, and inferences about psychological 
attributes. The societal domain refers to the 
child's developing concepts of stable systems of 
interactions between persons, for example, groups 
social organizations, and social structure. The 
moral domain refers to the child's developing 
conceptions of justice and fairness. (p. 49} 
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In essence, the societal domain is based on conventions that are 
arbitrary and particular to the social situation in which they are 
found. They deal with socially correct rules that are meaningful 
and followed only because the members of society have agreed that 
they are proper patterns of behavior. As Turiel ( 1978) described 
it: 
social conventions are behavioral uniformities that 
coordinate the actions of individuals participating 
in a social system .•.. social conventional acts are 
somewhat arbitrary in that they do not have an 
intrinsically prescriptive basis •.• although social 
conventions often have a specifiable ftu1ction within 
a given social context, their significance (unlike 
that of moral regulations) derives solely from that 
particular context. (p. 51) 
In contrast, morality deals with concepts of fairness that 
transcend social convention. They are rules that have meaning in 
themselves and would operate to control behavior even in the absence 
of social conventions. "In contrast to convention, moral 
considerations stem from factors intrinsic to actions: 
consequences such as harm inflicted upon others, violation of 
rights, effects on the general welfare" ('l'Uriel, 1978, p. 51). No 
culture-specific information would be needed to understand and apply 
moral concepts. 
Carter and Patterson (1982), in a study of 97 children at five 
grade levels, found support for TUriel' s notion that sex-role 
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beliefs are a part of the societal domain and considered social 
conventions and not moral imperatives as KohlberJ {1~66) suggested. 
In short, they found that "changes in children's conceptions of sex-
role stereotype flexibility occurred concurrently with changes in 
social-conventional flexibility but were unrelated to changes in 
children's conceptions of the natural law" (p. 812). In their view, 
the children realized the distinction between arbitrary conventions 
and relatively unchanging natural laws such as moral imperatives. 
Following TUriel's reasoning, two possible associations between 
moral reasoning and sex-role preferences may be expected. First, 
the relationship between moral maturity and sex-role preferences 
described by the sex-role researchers should not necessarily emerge. 
If the two domains are indeed separate the movement from a low level 
of moral maturity to a high level should not necessarily parallel a 
movement from "traditional'' to ''modern 11 sex-role preferences. In 
essence, individuals at any level of moral maturity could hold 
''tradi tional 11 or "modem" sex-role preferences ( 5mi th & Bonar, 
1984). Second, in terms of moral orientation, one can expect those 
using either the Gilligan concern for 11 Carejresponsibility" or the 
Kohlberg concern for 11 rights/justice" to be found at all levels of 
the "tradi tiona!" to "modern11 sex-role orientation scale. 
As Lyons suggested, studying the relationships between the 
moral orientation and the societal domain would be an important 
extension of present knowledge. This study was an attempt to 
examine these relationships. To carry out the study, modes of moral 
18 
orientation and level of moral maturity were defined and then 
examined for their possible relationships to decision-making in the 
societal domain about the conventions of sex-role preferences. 
Research Questions 
Based on the literature, these research questions seem 
warranted. Given that Gilligan theorizes that there are two modes 
of moral orientation that are differently socialized for men and 
women, is there a sex difference in moral orientation? Would there 
be a relationship between mode of moral orientation and moral 
maturity for men and women? Since real life problems may show 
different moral modes and moral maturity levels used by men and 
women, would there be a difference in the societal domain of sex-
role orientation in family issues? The purpose of this research is 
to answer these questions. 
CII!\PTER I I 
ME'l'HODS l\ND PROCEDURE 
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The purpose of this research was to study the relationships 
among mode of moral orientation, moral maturity, and decision-making 
about sex-role preferences in the societal domain. These 
relationships were examined from two theoretical viewpoints. 
Gilligan's theory about two moral orientations was examined. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
The objective of this part of the study was to examine the 
relationships among sex, moral maturity, and moral orientation. To 
fulfill this objective, three null hypotheses were employed: 
1. There will be no relationship between sex and moral 
orientation (care vs. rights). 
2. There will be no relationship between sex and level of 
moral maturity. 
3. There will be no relationship between level of moral 
maturity and moral orientation. 
The second part of the study extended the current knowledge 
about decision-making in the moral domain to decision-making in the 
societal domain of sex-role preferences. 'Ihe first objective was to 
examine the relationship between sex-role preferences expressed and 
level of moral maturity. The second objective was to examine the 
relationships among mode of moral orientation, level of moral 
maturity, and mode of moral orientation used in decision-making 
about sex-role preferences. 
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Six null hypotheses were employed to carry out the objectives 
concerning the UDral and social domains. 
4. illere will be no relationship between the sex of the 
respondents and their sex-role orientation. 
5. illere will be no relationship between level of moral 
maturity and sex-role orientation. 
6. ibere will be no relationship between level of moral 
maturity and moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-
role orientation. 
7. There will be no relationship between the 1110ral orientation 
exhibited by an individual and his/her sex-role orientation. 
8. ibere will be no relationship between moral orientation 
measured by hypothetical dilemmas and 1110ral orientation used in 
decision-making about sex-role orientation. 
9. There will be no relationship between the sex of the 
respondents and the mode of moral orientation used in decisions 
about sex-role orientation. 
Subject Selection 
Subjects for the study were selected on the basis of previous 
research. Since Gilligan has suggested that there are two moral 
orientations and that, although they are used by both sexes, males 
are socialized to use the "rightS/justice" orientation and females 
are socialized to use the "care/responsibility" orientation, it was 
imperative that both male and female subjects be included in the 
study. 
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Based on Kohlberg's theorizing, several studies have shown that 
postconventiona1 reasoning is marked by an ability to separate 
social conventions from moral imperatives (Leahy & Either, 1980J 
Brock, 1973; Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1984; Robinson & Green, 
1981). Thus, postconventiona1 individuals may view their sex-role 
behaviors as being less bound by stereotypic social convention. 
Basic to Kohlberg's theory is also the notion that movement through 
the stages of 1110ral devel-t is the result of the encountering 
and working out of 1110ral dilemmas faced by each individual. As a 
result, men and women will only reach similar levels of moral 
reasoning when their opporttmi ties for social interaction and 
responsibilities for decision-making are similar (Kohlberg, 1971). 
In addition, walker (1986) found education to be an important 
predictor of 1110ral maturity. His analysis showed that no one 
without post-secondary education attained a stage 4 level of moral 
reasoning. 
In keeping with these notions, it was decided that the sample 
must include both men and women who were likely to have had 
significant and similar opportunities for social interaction and 
decision-making. The accessible population that fit these criteria 
were graduate students. It was expected that men and wcmen at this 
level of educational achievement would have been exposed to, at 
least, somewhat comparable opportunities for social interaction and 
decision-making and would thus be at a high level of moral 
reasoning. The selection of these subjects would also allow an 
examination of Gilligan's (1982) suggestion that women will 
consistently reason from a perspective of care and connectedness 
regardless of achievement levels or occupation. 
Subjects for the study were students in various graduate 
classes who volunteered to participate in the study. Before 
receiving the questionnaires the subjects were informed of the 
nature of the study and told that if for any reason they did not 
wish to participate in the study they were free to decline. They 
were also informed of this choice in the written introduction that 
accompanied each questionnaire. To be included in the study, the 
subjects needed to be graduate students and American citizens who 
had been reared in the United States. 
Description of the Sample 
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The study sample consisted of graduate students from three 
states. In one state (northeastern), 98 questionnaires were 
distributed and 45 were returned. The return rate was 46%. In the 
two southern states, 130 questionnaires were distributed and 46 
returned for a return rate of 36%. Overall, 228 questionnaires 
were distributed and 91 ( 87 of which were usable) were returned for 
a return rate of 40%. The sample was made up of 52 women and 35 
men. Of the women, 27 were from the northern state and 25 were from 
the southern states. For the men, 17 were from the northern state 
and 18 from the southern states. Two of the returned questionnaires 
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were eliminated because they were from men who were citizens of 
another country and who had spent the majority of their lives in 
that country. Two of the questioMaires from females were returned 
incomplete and were therefore eliminated from the study. 
To further describe the group under study, information for six 
demographic variables was collected: age, college major, state, 
race, country of citizenship, and country in which the respondents 
had spent the majority of their lives. This information gave a more 
detailed picture of the sample. First, the average age (31. 7) of 
this group of graduate students was higher than the age of the 
typical sample of college students. Second, 15 specific college 
majors were reported. These 15 majors were categorized into six 
general areas: Im.tsic (24), education (20), business (15), social 
science (16), science (5), and liberal arts (7). Third, the sample 
carne from two states in the Eastern United States, one being in the 
northeast and one in the southeast. Fourth, race was nearly a 
constant. All of the women sampled were caucasian, whereas, among 
the men there were two blacks and no other minorities represented. 
The last two variables were also constants. As specified in the 
research design, only respondents who were citizens of the United 
States and who had lived the majority of their lives in this country 
were included in the sample. 
Instruments and Scoring 
In this section, the four questionnaires used in the study are 
described. Included for each questionnaire is general background 
24 
information on the development of the instrument, a description of 
how each was used in this study, and the specific scoring procedt.:.rc ~ • 
used. 
Mode of Moral Orientation 
Mode of moral orientation was determined using a procedure, 
developed by the researcher, that was a variation of Pratt and 
Royer's (1982) methodology (Questionnaires 1A- 10, Appendix A). 
Four dilemmas from Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) were used. 
Subjects were first asked to read the moral dilemma. Next, for each 
dilermna, the subjects rated each of the 9 items for its importance 
in their decision-making. Alterations made to the DIT by the 
researcher were designed to allow the subjects to choose between 
alternatives that emphasized a concern for individual rights and a 
concern for care and responsibility toward others. One item from 
the original DIT scale representing each of the top four levels of 
moral reasoning (levels 3 to 6) was altered to represent either a 
11 rights;justice" moral orientation (Kohlberg) or a "care; 
responsibility" orientation (Gilligan). Since the subjects in this 
study were expected to be at a high level of moral maturity and 
Pratt and Royer ( 1982) found no stage effects or interactions in 
their study, it was decided to use items from the four top stages. 
Thus, for each stage level, the same statement was included in two 
forms so as to give the subjects a choice between the two 
perspectives. For example, in the "Doctor's Dilemma" one item read, 
"Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible way to care for 
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someone and protect them from harm?" when representing the "care'' 
mode, and "Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible way 
to protect the rights of a member of society?" when representing 
the "rights" mode. In an attempt to assess construct validity, the 
i terns on the four scales were examined by three reviewers who were 
familiar with the OIT and the two moral orientations being 
measured. 
The rating scale for each item contained five possible choices 
ranging from "none at all" to "great." The choices were assigned 
numbers ranging from 1 for the "not at all 11 response to 5 for the 
"great" response. The responses to ''care'' and "rights'' items for 
each dilemma were totaled separately to produce a score for each 
moral orientation. The scores for the four dilemmas were then 
totaled to produce an overall score for each orientation. Scores 
for each orientation ranged from 4 to 20 on the individual dilemmas. 
Total scores across the four dilemmas ranged from 16 to 80 for each 
orientation. 
Two reliability checks were also included. First, one grand 
sounding but meaningless i tern from the original test was included 
for each diletm~a. 11These items do not represent any stage of 
thinking but rather represent a subject's tendency to endorse 
statements for their pretentiousness rather than their meaning11 
(Rest, 1983, p. 3.3). Following Rest's instructions, those who 
consistently rated these distractor items high were eliminated from 
the study. Second, after rating the nine statements, the subjects 
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were asked to select, in order, the four most important items from 
the list of nine. If the ratings of the nine items were 
inconsistent with the four most important selections on two of the 
four stories, the subject was eliminated from the study. Using 
these criteria, two of the female's questionnaires were eliminated 
from the study. 
Since these scales were altered forms of Rest's Defining Issues 
Test (DIT): the face validity of each was tested using three judges 
who were familiar with the concepts and theories being tested. Each 
judge was asked to read the statements under the four dilemmas and 
to indicate whether they represented a "rights/justice" or a 
"care;responsibility" moral orientation. From these scores, 
interjudge reliability was measured using the 2!! coefficient and 
the percentage of agreement. The values of the correlation and 
percentages of agreement between the three judges were as follows: 
judges 1 and 2-.93 (97%); judges 1 and 3-.69 (84%); and, judges 
2 and 3 = .73 (88%). 
Moral Maturity 
TO measure level of moral maturity the Hogan and Dickstein 
(1972) Maturity of Moral Judgement scale (MMJ) was administered 
(Questionnaire 2, Appendix A). The scale was created as a 11briefer 
and more readily scorable test which nonetheless elicits a full 
range of moral responses" (Hogan & Dickstein, 1972). In a test of 
four mea sur's of moral reasoning, Wilmoth and McFarland ( 1977) 
found the MMJ to be a "quick, reliable, and valid index of mature 
moral thought" (p. 400). 
To administer this scale, a series of statements was given 
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with each posing a moral issue. 'Itle subjects were asked to read the 
15 statements, assuming they had been made by SOIII!one with whom they 
were having a conversation. '!hey were then asked to give a reaction 
to each statement. '!be responses were rated according to four 
elements: (a) concern for the sanctity of the individual; (a) 
judgements based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law; 
(c) concem for the welfare of society as a whole; (d) capacity to 
see both sides of an issue. '!be specific scoring procedure was 
described by Hogan and Dickstein (1972): 
A response was assigned 2 points if any one of the 
four scoring elements was clearly present. An answer 
was given 1 point if any of the four scoring elements 
could be easily and readily inferred. A response was 
given 0 points if none of the scoring elements was 
present in the reply. Each of the 15 items could 
receive a maximum of 2 points. 'lbus, scores en this 
procedure could range from 0 to 30. (p. 211) 
It should be noted that these criteria do not represent stages of 
moral reasoning. '!bey were given equal value in measuring moral 
maturity and produced a continuous measure without differentiating 
the stage levels identified by Kohlberg. 
Following the Bogan and Dickstein procedure, three raters 
scored each item using the procedure described above. The scores 
given to each person were then averaged to produce a final score of 
maturity of moral judgement. 
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Sex-Role Orientation 
To measure sex-role orientation Tomeh's (1978) Sex-Role 
Orientation scale (Questionnaire 3, Appendix A) was used. The scale 
consists of twenty-four items designed to ~licit the subject's 
attitudes toward the social roles of men and women. To develop her 
scale Tomeh built upon previous sex-role scales developed by Brogan 
and Kutner (1976), scanzoni (1975), and osmond and Martin (1975). 
The items on the scale were designed to elicit information about 
three catagodes of sex-role beliefs: (a} the "Nontraditional Wife-
Mother Role"-defined by Tomeh (1978) as 11 tepresenting an emphasis 
in which the interests of husband and children are neither of 
greater significance than nor are they placed ahead of those of the 
wife or mother" (p. 342); (b) the "Nontraditional Husband-Father 
Role"-which was seen as a "departure from the orientation of 
patriarchalism in which the greater significance of the husband-
father's interests and authority are based on the exclusive ascribed 
status of sex" (p. 342); and (c) "Problematic Husband-wife 
Alterations"-that involve "an emphasis on the husband's interests 
which basically remain ahead of or more significant than those of 
the wife, with the real possibility of temporal and tentative 
sacrifices in the husband's interests to accommodate those of the 
wife" (p. 342). 
To test the reliability of the scale, Tomeh correlated each 
item with the total score of the scale within which it appeared. 
The results of Pearson's .E for each of the three catagories of the 
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overall scale were significant at the .001 level. Since the scale 
was based on Scanzoni 's sex-Role Preference Scale, which was 
subjected to a factor analysis, construct validity was assumed for 
the Sex-Role Orientation Scale. 
To complete the scale, subjects were asked to read each 
statement and then to indicate, on a four point Likert-type scale, 
the response that mosf closely described their beliefs. Possible 
responses ranged from "definitely not" to "definitely so." The 
responses were scored from 0 to 3. The scores for the individual 
items were totaled to produce an overall score. Total scores on the 
scale could range from 0 to 72. Using this score, each subject was 
placed on a scale of sex-role preferences ranging from "traditional" 
to "modern." As suggested earlier, greater role modemi ty was 
characterized by stronger preferences for individualistic interests 
whereas greater role traditionalism was represented by stronger 
preferences for the interests of others. 
Moral Orientation Used in Decision-Making 
In order to measure moral orientation used in making decisions 
about sex-role orientation, subjects were asked to reread five of 
the items from the SRO scale and to write a short explanation for 
the objective answer that was given (Questionnaire 4, Appendix A). 
The i terns were chosen to represent the three categories of 
statements used by Tomeh. 
These items were scored for elements of "care/responsibility'' 
and "rights/justice." Following Lyons (1983) scoring scheme, each 
30 
part of the statement was coded as representing either the "rights'' 
or the "care" perspective. From this analysis, each of the six 
answers was designated as representing either a "rights" or "care" 
perspective. The total number of "care 11 responses and the total 
number of "rights" responses were then obtained. From this number 
the subject was designated as using either predominantly a "care" or 
"rights" mode in decision making. 
Following Lyon's procedure, interceder reliability was 
established by using three independent coders. Each coder was asked 
to score the questionnaire as described. Interceder reliability was 
measured using the £h! coefficient and the percentages of agreement 
between the scores of the three judges. The values of the 
correlation and percentages of agreement between the three judges 
were as follows: judges 1 and 2 = • 71 ( 86%); judges 1 and 3 • • 71 
(86%); and, judges 2 and 3 = .60 (79%). 
Pilot Test of Questionnaires 
Before the questionnaires were given to any subjects a pilot 
study was conducted using four students in a graduate research 
design class. The questionnaires were given to these students with 
the instructions to be used in the study. The students were first 
allowed to complete the questionnaires. Next, they were told the 
purpose of each questionnaire and lead through a discussion of 
whether or not the instrument was measuring the desired 
information. Finally, the students were asked to address any 
problems they found. As a result of their analysis, some of the 
wording in the questions and instructions for the questionnaires 
were refined. 
Data Collection 
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Data collection for the study involved the researcher or an 
assistant meeting with most of the subjects as a group during a 
regularly scheduled class period and distributing the 
questionnaires. The general nature of the study was described and 
the subjects were asked to return the questionnaires to the 
researcher by mail. In addition, as a result of an especially poor 
return rate for the male volunteers, a number of questionnaires were 
given out individually to graduate students following the same 
protocol as noted above. 
After completing the demographic questions, the subjects 
completed altered version of Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test. 
Following Pratt and Royer's {1982) procedure, the test was altered 
by the researcher to provide a measure of moral judgement or 
orientation (rights vs. responsibility). 
Next, Hogan and Dickstein's (1972) Maturity of Moral Judgement 
scale was administered. This scale involved a short narrative 
response to 15 statements about moral choices. The scale gave a 
continuous measure of moral maturity that did not identify stages of 
moral development. 
The second pair of questionnaires dealt with the subjects 
beliefs about sex-roles. First, Tomeh's (1978) sex-Role Orientation 
scale was completed. Next, the subjects were asked to reread five 
----------
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of the objective questions answered on the TOmeh scale and to write 
a statement for each of the five explaining why they responded the 
way they did. The statements used were chosen to represent the 
three catagories of statements defined by Tomeh ( 1978) when 
developing the questionnaire. The specific questions were selected 
by assigning a number to each question and using a table of random 
m.unbers. An odd number was used to avoid ties in the scoring of the 
scale. This procedure gave the subjects a chance not to just make a 
choice, but to also give a rationale for that choice. The 
responses were analyzed to determine the mode of decision-making 
employed (rights/justice or care/responsibility) in making decisions 
about preferred behaviors for men and women. In this way, the 
connection between mode of moral orientation and sex-role 
preferences were compared. This type of analysis seemed warranted 
as some have expressed concern as to the validity of accepting only 
objective selections as indicative of reasoning about sex-role 
preferences. Lyons (1983), for example, suggested that: 
The language of morality nrust always be scrutinized 
for differences in underlying meaning. For example, 
words like 'obligation' or 'responsibility' can not 
be taken at face value. (The moral imperatives of 
what one is 'obliged' to do, or what 
'responsibilities' one has are, in fact, shaped by 
one's perspective towards others.) (p. 137) 
Data Analysis 
To analyze the data collected, four different statistical tests 
were employed: correlation, t-test, chi-square, and regression 
analysis. Following the earlier presentation, the null hypotheses 
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to be tested were examined from two theoretical perspectives. ibe 
first qroup of three hypotheses was desiqned to test Gilliqan • s 
theory of moral orientation. To examine the first two hypotheses 
that involved continuous dependent variables and a cateqorical 
independent variable, t-tests were employed. In the first case, the 
test examined whether there was a significant difference between the 
level of moral maturity of males and females. In the second case, 
the test examined whether there was a siqnificant difference between 
males' and females' uses of moral orientation. 'l'o test the 
significance of moral maturity as a predictor of moral orientation, 
a regression analysis was performed. 
The second qroup of six hypotheses was tested followinq a 
similar procedure. (a) A t-test was used to analyze the difference 
in sex-role orientation between the male and female respondents. 
(b) A reqression analysis was used to test the siqnificanoe of moral 
maturity as a predictor of sex-role orientation. (c) A t-test was 
also used to analyze the difference in level of moral maturity for 
the "care'' and "rights" modes of moral orientation used in decision 
makinq sbout sex-role orientation. (d) A reqression analysis was 
used to test the significance of mode of moral orientation as 
predictors of sex-role orientation. (e) A t-test was used to 
analyze the difference in moral orientation used in hypothetical 
moral dilemmas for those using the "care" and "rights" moral 
orientations in decisions sbout sex-role orientation. (f) To test 
the relationship between the two cateqorical variables, sex and mode 
of moral orientation used in decision making about sex-role 
preferences, a chi-square test of significance was computed. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
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To obtain a more complete picture of the relationships that 
existed among the variables under study, the results of the 
statistical analyses were computed, where appropriate, for each sex 
separately and for the group as a whole. All tests were computed at 
the .OS level of significance. 
Central Tendencies of the Data 
Means and standard deviations for the continuous variables were 
computed (see Table 1) • From these data three points can be 
emphasized. First, the Moral Maturity Judgement scores (MMJ) showed 
high consistency. A standard deviation of 4.7 indicated that the 
members of the group had reached similar levels of moral maturity. 
Second, a mean of 58.6 indicated that the subjects were generally 
"modern" in sex-role orientation (SRO). This was expected, since 
past research has shown this to be true of highly educated 
individuals. Last, the mean scores and standard deviations on the 
moral orientation scales (CARE and RIGHTS) were virtually equal. 
Rather than showing a preference for the "care;responsibili ty" or 
"rights/justice" orientation, the men and women showed a nearly 
equal concern for the two orientations. 
Table 1 
Central Tendencies for Age, care Orientation, 
Rights Orientation, Moral Maturity, 
and Sex-Role Orientation 
SUbjects AGE CAREa RIGR'rs" MMJC SROd 
women 
----r<ean 31.4 49.1 50.2 16.8 59.6 
SD 9.4 8.9 8.3 3.6 7.8 
Range 21-72 32-63 29-65 12-27 39-72 
Men 
-Mean 32.1 46.7 47.0 17.1 57.0 
SD 6.0 9.5 9.8 5.9 8.0 
Range 23-44 31-64 28-64 7-28 40-70 
All 
Mean 31.7 48.1 48.9 16.9 58.6 
SD 8.1 9.2 9.0 4.7 8.0 
Range 21-72 31-64 28-65 7-28 39-72 
aCARE "' Care Moral Orientation (16-80; 16 • low concern 
SO • high concern) 
bRIGHTS = Rights Moral Orientation (16-80; 16 "' low concern 
80 "' high concern) 
cMMJ ::: Moral Maturity Judgement ( 0-30; 0 "" low, 30 .. high) 
dSRO "" Sex-Role Orientation ( 0-72; 0 "" very tradi tiona! 
72 "" very modern) 
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Analysis of Demographic and Major Research Variables 
Demographic variables (age, college major, and region) were 
collected and analyzed for any effects they had on the major 
research variables. The average age of the sample was 31.7, ranging 
from 21 to 72. This was a distinct advantage, since a goal of the 
study was to examine a sample that was likely to have experienced 
the kind of moral dilemmas that bring the opportunity to move to 
higher levels of moral reasoning. Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
were computed between age and the four variables of interest: care 
orientation (CARE), Rights Orientation (RIGHTS), moral maturity 
(MMJ), and sex-role orientation (SRO) (see Table 2). The 
coefficients were all low, ranging from! = .11 for age and sex-role 
orientation (SRO), to f. "" .20 for age and moral maturity (MMJ). The 
value for age and moral maturity was significant (p < .05). The 
regression of age on MMJ, however, failed to reach significance 
(!' <== • 08). The correlations for these variables were not 
significant for the men or for the women. A !-test using all 
subjects also indicated no significant difference between the ages 
of those in the "rights/justice'' and "care/responsibility" groups on 
the decision-making (DEC) scale. 
The effects of college major on the continuous variables were 
measured using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) • The tests for all 
subjects indicated that there were no significant differences 
between the scores on the four continuous variables obtained by the 
six different majors. For the men, a significant relationship 
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Table 2 
correlation Matrix for Age, Care Orientation, 
Rights Orientation, Moral Maturity, 
and Sex-Role Orientation 
CARE RIGHTS MORAL SEX-ROLE 
variables AGE ORIENTATION ORIENTATION MATURITl! ORIENTATION 
All Subjects ( n c 87) 
AGE -.11 -.14 .20* .11 
CARE 0 75*** .17 .30** 
RIGHTS .22• .23** 
MMJ .31*** 
SRO 
Women only (n = 52) 
AGE -.10 -.14 .24 .06 
CARE . 70*** .08 .33** 
RIGHTS .14 .23* 
MMJ .22 
SRO 
Men only (n • 35) 
AGE -.16 -.16 .21 .25 
CARE .80*** .23 .23 
RIGHTS .28• .20 
MMJ .43*** 
SRO 
*! < • 05. **E < .01 • ***~ < .005 
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(!: (4,30) • 3.4110, p • .02) did appear for the soores on the 
"care/responsibility" (CARE - Questionnaire 1A - lD) variable. The 
highest means were in the education (52.2) and business majors 
(52.0), while the lowest means were in the music (40.1) and science 
groups (41.2). In essence, those men in the education and business 
majors were more concerned with the "care/responsibility" issues on 
the moral orientation scales than were their counterparts majoring 
in music and the sciences. 
A chi-square test of independence was used to examine the 
relationship between college major and moral orientation in 
decision-making (DEC). The results showed no significant 
relationships between the different college majors and the moral 
orientation used in making decisions about sex-role preferences 
( care;responsibili ty vs. rights/justice) • 
Since the subjects in the smrple were drawn from be different 
regions of the Eastern united States, !:-tests were computed to 
measure the effects of region on the continuous variables. 'lbe 
results indicated no significant differences between the groups from 
the two states on any of the variables for men, women, or both 
groups combined. 
Testing of HypOtheses 
Two perspectives were taken to explore the relationships amng 
mode of moral orientation, moral maturity, sex-role orientation, and 
moral orientation used in decision-making about sex-role 
orientation. First, three null hypotheses were used to test 
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Gilligan's (1982) theorizing about moral orientation. Next, six 
null hypotheses were used to extend the current knowledge about the 
relationships between moral orientation and decision-making in the 
moral domain (Lyons, 1983) , into decision-making in the societal 
domain (Turiel, 1978). 
Gilligan's Theory 
To get a broad view of the relationships amng the variables, 
data were analyzed not only for differences between the women and 
men, but also for the women and men alone. Three null hypotheses 
were considered. 
Hypothesis 1: There will be no relationship between sex 
and moral orientation (CARE and RIGHTS) • 
Two .!;-tests were employed to examine this relationship. ihe 
first one examined the difference between men and women on the 
"care/responsibility" (CARE) score (see Table 3). The second one 
examined the difference between men and ...,..n on the "rights/ 
justice" (RIGHTS) score. 
Gilligan has posited that, regardless of level of moral 
maturity, women will adopt a "care/responsibility" mode of moral 
orientation; whereas men will use a "ritJh.ts;justice" orientation. 
Her notions were partially supported by the data. Althcugh the 
women's mean scores were higher on both scales, the !;-tests 
revealed no significant difference between the two groups on either 
the CARE or the RIGHTS variables (see Table 3). In addition, the 
high correlation (! • .75, p < .005) (refer to Table 2) between 
Table 3 
Difference in Care Orientation, Rights Orientation, Moral 
Maturity (MMJ), and Sex-Role Orientation (SRO) 
Between Men and women 
variables 
CARE 
RIGHTS 
MMJ 
SRO 
Difference 
2.41 
3.24 
- .36 
2.27 
SE 
2.08 
2.03 
1.16 
1. 75 
OF 
79 1.1568 
80 1.6002 
75 -0.3079 
84 1.3028 
p[t] 
.125 
.057 
.621 
.098 
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these variables indicates that the respondents made little 
distinction between the two approaches when choosing what concepts 
were important in the moral decision. These findings were in 
contrast to Gilligan's suggestion that women are more likely to 
reason from a position of "care;responsibility," whereas men are 
more likely to reason from a position of "rights/justice". 
In summary, the data did not support the rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the "rights/justice" orientation or for the "care; 
responsibility" orientation. Men and women in this study were 
equally likely to use the "care" and "rights" orientations. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be no relationship between sex 
and level of moral maturity (MMJ). 
This hypothesis was also examined through a !-test (refer to 
Table 3). The data supported Gilligan's theory that women and men, 
given similar types of experiences and levels of education, will 
reach similar levels of moral maturity. There was no significant 
difference between the men and women an the MMJ, and thus, no 
support for rejection of the null hypothesis. Men and women in this 
study had similar levels of moral maturity. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no relationship between level 
of moral maturity (MM.J) and moral orientation 
(CARE and RIGHTS) • 
Gilligan has suggested that the use of the "care'' moral 
orientation by women and the "rights" moral orientation by men will 
cut across the levels of moral maturity. In essence, one does not 
change orientation as the level of moral maturity rises. 
Correlation and regression procedures were employed to test 
Hypothesis 3 for women alone, men alone, and both men and women 
together. The tests, using all subjects, revealed positive 
correlations between scores on the MMJ and the RIGHTS and CARE 
scales (refer to Table 2). The correlation for the MMJ and the 
RIGHTS variable was significant (E = .22, p <= .05). Regression 
analysis of the MMJ on the RIGHTS variable did not produce a 
significant! value (see Table 4). Therefore, moral maturity did 
not predict either a "rights" or a "care" moral orientation. 
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Looking at the same variables for men and women separately 
different results were produced (refer to Table 1). For the women 
there was no significant correlation between MMJ and either of the 
two moral orientations. Regression analysis did not reach the .OS 
level of significance (see Table 4). The correlation between MMJ 
and the RIGHTS variable (! = .28) (refer to Table 2) was significant 
for the men, but the regression analysis failed to produce a 
significant!' value (see Table 4). 
Taken as a whole, the data partially supported Gilligan's 
statement. Although they were not significant predictors, higher 
scores on the MMJ were significantly correlated with higher scores 
on the RIGHTS scale especially for the men. 
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Table 4 
Regression of Moral Maturity on Rights and 
care Moral Orientations 
Beta SE p!tl 
I. RIGHTS ORIENTATION 
All Subjects 
MMJ 
Multiple R2 "' .049 (ns) 
.394 .204 1.9282 .05* 
Women Only 
MMJ 2 .313 .342 0.9135 .14 
Multiple R ~ .020 (ns) 
Men Only 
MMJ 2 .434 .268 1.6212 .OS* 
Multiple R ~ .078 (ns) 
II. CARE ORIENTATION 
All Subjects 
MMJ 2 .315 .222 1.4143 .OS 
Multiple R "' .027 (ns) 
Women Only 
MMJ 2 .201 .391 0.5145 .30 
Multiple R • . 007 ( ns) 
Men Only 
:fuple a2 "" .053 (ns) 
.369 .279 1.3224 .10 
*Significant 
Moral Orientation and the Societal Domain 
The second part of the study was designed to extend current 
knowledge about decision-making in the moral domain into decision-
making in the societal domain. The societal domain in this study 
was the sex-role orientation. Six null hypotheses were posed to 
examine the relationships in this area. 
Hypothesis 4: 'lbere will be no relationship between the 
sex of the respondent and the sex-role 
orientation (SRO). 
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A ~-test indicated no significant difference between the men 
and women on the SRO scores (refer to Table 3) • Thus, rejection of 
the null hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be no relationship between level 
of moral maturity (MMJ) and sex-role 
orientation (SRO). 
Correlation and regression procedures were used to test the 
relationship between level of moral maturity (MMJ) and sex-role 
orientation (SRO). For all subjects, there was a positive and 
significant correlation (! •.31) between the two variables (refer to 
Table 2) • Regression analysis also revealed the relationship to be 
significant (! (1, 74) = 8.0463, l! = .006) (see Table 5). An 
increase in moral maturity was associated with a movement toward a 
more "modem" sex-role orientation. Moral maturity was a 
significant predictor of sex-role orientation {SilO). Taken 
together, these data supported rejection of the null hypothesis. 
All SUbjects 
MMJ 
Table 5 
Regression of sex-Role Orientation (SRO) 
on Moral Maturity (MMJ) 
Beta SE 
.313 .184 2.8366 
Multiple R Squared • .098 (F • 8.0463, p • .006)• 
women Only 
.520 .349 1.4884 
Multiple R Squared -= .050 (ns) 
.524 .203 2.5778 
Multiple R Squared= .181 (F • 6.6450, 11 • .015)• 
•significant 
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p!tl 
.005* 
.07 
.00511 
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To understand more clearly the relationship between the two 
variables, the MMJ and SRO scores were also examined for men and 
women separately. The analyses revealed an interesting difference 
between the two groups. For the women, the correlation between the 
two variables was positive (! =.22) but not significant (refer to 
Table 2). This and the nonsignificant results of the regression 
equation did not provide evidence to support rejection of the null 
hypothesis (refer to Table 5). 
Very different results carne from the analysis of the data from 
the men (refer to Table 2). The correlation was much higher than 
for the women (! = .43, _p < .005). The regression of MMJ on SRO was 
statistically significant (! (1,30) - 6.6450, E- .015) (refer to 
Table 5). These data for the men supported the sex-role 
researchers' notion that a movement to higher levels of moral 
maturity will be accompanied by a movement toward more "modern" sex-
role beliefs. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be no difference in level of 
moral maturity (MMJ) between the "care" and 
"rights" moral orientation used in decision-
making about sex-role orientation. 
The results of the t-test indicated no significant difference 
in moral maturity between those who presented a 11care; 
responsibility" mode of decision-making about sex-role behaviors and 
those using the "rights/justice" orientation (DEC) (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Difference in Level of Moral Maturity {MMJ) Between 
the Care and Rights Moral Orientation 
in the Sex-Role Decisions 
Difference SE DF 
All Subjects 
Moral Maturity 1.34 1.11 75 1.2028 
Women Only 
Moral Maturity -1.12 1.24 42 -0.9006 
Men Qnly 
Moral Maturity 4.04 2.01 32 2.0071 
*Significant 
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p[t] 
.12 
.81 
.03* 
!d!us, the data for the total sample did not support rejection of 
the null hypothesis. 
49 
Once again, separate analyses for the men and women revealed an 
interesting difference. Although the women showed no significant 
differences between the two sets of scores, the same was not true of 
the men. For this group, the moral maturity scores were 
significantly higher for the "care'' group than for the "rights" 
group. In SUJIUtiBry, those men who used a "care" mode in making 
decisions about sex-role preferences were significantly higher in 
moral maturity than those men who made decisions using the "rights" 
orientation. 
Hypothesis 7: There will be no relationship between the 
moral orientation (CARE and RIGHTS) exhibited 
by an individual and his/her sex-role 
orientation (SBO). 
A correlation using both men and women together showed thet the 
CARE and RIGHTS scores had a significant, but low positive 
correlation with the SBO scores (,~ • .30 and! • .23, p < .01) 
(refer to Table 2) • In essence, as the subjects showed a greater 
concern for "care'' and "rights" orientations, they also were more 
"modem" in their sex-role orientation. In the regression analysis 
both CARE and RIGHTS scores were significant predictors of SRO (see 
Table 7). 
'lbese same results were not obtained when the total sample was 
broken into the two smaller groups. For the men, the correlations 
-1• 7 
Regression of care and Rights Moral Orientations 
on Sex-Role Orientation (SRO) 
All SUbjects 
care 
Beta 
.297 
Sl! 
.093 2. 7S33 
)llltiple R Squared • .089 (F • 7.S809, p • .007)* 
so 
p[tJ 
.ODS* 
Rights .226 .119 2.DS3S .01• 
Multiple R Squared • .051 (F • 4.2170, p • .043)* 
WOmen Only 
care .357 .1SO 2.37S4 
)lllt1p1e R Squared = .111 (F • S.6426, p • .02)* 
Rights 
Men Only 
Care 
.217 .137 
)llltiple R Squared • .OS3 (ns) 
.303 .208 
)llltiple R Squared • .006 (ns) 
Rights .312 .205 
)llltiple R Squared • .070 (ns) 
•significant 
1.5866 
1.4S76 
1.5225 
.01* 
.OS* 
.07 
.06 
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were positive with the CARE and !liGHTS correlations being ! • .23 
and!~ .20 respectively (refer to "!'able 2). 'lhese scores did not 
reach the • 05 level of significance. 
The women, in this case, showed very different results. For 
this group the CARE and SRO correlation was higher than that for the 
!liGHTS (! • • 33) and SRO (! • • 23) (refer to Table 2) • Both of the 
scores reached significance (E < .01 and 11 < .05, respectively). 
Regression analysis showed SRO to be a significant predictor of CARE 
(refer to Table 7) • The regression of SRO on IIIGBTS did not reach 
significance. For hypothesis 4 then, the data supported rejection 
of the null hypothesis for the total group. This also held true for 
the women on the CARE variable only. Data for the men alone did not 
support rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be no difference in moral 
orientation measured using hypothetical 
dilemmas (CARE and IIIGBTS) between the care 
and rights moral orientation used in 
decision-making about sex-role orientation. 
· To test this hypothesis two .!;-tests were employed. 'lbe first 
test indicated no significant difference between the group who used 
the "care'' orientation and the group who used the "rights!! 
orientation in making decisions about sex-role orientation, in the 
"care 11 moral orientation (CARE) measured using hypothetical moral 
dileDIIIas. '!he second t-test showed no significant difference 
between the group who used the 11care'' orientation and the group who 
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used the 11 rights 11 orientation in making decisions about sex-role 
orientation, in the "rights" moral orientation (RIGHTS) measured 
using hypothetical moral dilermnas. Similar results were obtained 
when the men and women were examined separately on these variables. 
Thus, there was no support for rejecting the null hypothesis for the 
total sample, the men alone, or the women alone. 
Hypothesis 9: There will be no relationship between the sex 
of the respondent and the mode of moral 
orientation used in decisions about sex-role 
orientation. 
To test the relationship between these two categorical 
variables a chi-square test of significance was used. The test 
revealed no significant relationship between the men and women on 
the moral orientation used in decisions about sex-role beliefs (see 
Table 8). Thus, there was no support for rejecting the null 
hypotheses. 
Male 
Table 8 
Relationship between Sex and Moral Orientation 
used in Sex-Role Decisions (Frequenci"es) 
Moral Orientation 
care Rights 
16 15 
Female 30 18 
Chi Square = • 9170, E = • 33 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMI\RY, CONCWSIONS, AND DISCUSSION 
This study was an attempt to analyze the relationships that 
exist among three variables: level of moral maturity, moral 
orientation, and, sex-role orientation. The purposes of the study 
were (a) to examine suggestions that there are two modes of moral 
reasoning (Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986), and (b) to extend current 
knowledge about the relationship bet...,en moral reasoning and sex-
role preferences by moving away fran the much studied psychological 
measures of intrinsic sex-role self concept and concentrating on the 
sociological measures of social conventions and decision-making in 
the societal domain ( Turiel, 1978) • 
Four questionnaires were used to gather the data. An altered 
form of Rest's Defining Issues Test was used to measure the mode of 
moral orientation taken by the individual 'When confronted with four 
moral dil.._s. Moral orientation was defined as being either an 
euphasis on the •care/[esponsibility" issues described by Gilligan 
(1977, 1982), or the "rights/:lustice" issues described by Kohlberg 
( 1981) • The level of moral maturity was measured by the Maturity of 
Moral JUdgement scale developed by Hogan and Dickstein ( 1972) • 
'l'omeh' s ( 1978) Sex-Role Orientation scale was used to measure the 
degree of "nontradi tiona!" beliefs about family behaviors held by 
males and females. The moral orientation adopted by the respondent 
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when making decisions about the social conventions of sex-role 
behaviors was measured by an instrument devaloped by the researcher. 
In addition to these data, information on several demographic 
variables was collected and examined for possible influences on the 
variables under study. 
Data were collected from 87 graduate students who volunteered 
to participate in the study. The subjects were from two states in 
the eastern llnited States. They were citizens of the u.s. and had 
lived the majority of their lives in this country. There were 52 
females and 35 males in the sample. All of the females and all but 
two of the males were caucasian. -rhe demographic data revealed the 
sample to have a mean age of 31.7. The subjects had high and 
consistent levels of moral maturity, generally "modem" sex-role 
preferences, and a high concern for both the "care" and "rights" 
orientations to moral reasoning. The college major of the subjects 
had only one significant effect on the variables under study. The 
men majoring in education and business hed significantly higher CARE 
scores than men in the music or science categories. 
To test Gilligan's theories of moral reasoning, three null 
hypotheses were stated. Hypothesis one was a test of Gilligan's 
notion that, when confronted with moral dil..-s, women consistently 
reason from a position of "care" and "responsibility," while, in 
contrast 1 men consietently solve moral dilenanas using a "rights11 and 
"justice" approach. 'lhese assertions were not supported by the data 
in this study. There was no significant difference between the men 
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and women on either the CA1Ul or RIGIITS scales. - high correlation 
between the RIGHTS and CA1Ul scores suggests that little distinction 
was made between the two by either the men or the women. :!his 
supports Gilligan • s ( 1986) contention that both sexes understand and 
use both modes of moral orientation. 
The second null hypothesis was used to examine the idee that, 
as a result of the different approaches to moral dilemmas used by 
men and women, men tend to score higher on scales measuring level of 
moral maturity. Again there was .no support for rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 'D!ere was no significant difference between the 
men and women on level of moral maturity as measured by the Moral 
Maturity Judgement scale. 
Null hypothesis three was employed to examine Gilligan's notion 
that one's moral orientation does not change as level of moral 
maturity increases. She suggested that moral orientation will cut 
across level of moral maturity and will not move toward the 
"rights/justice" orientation as moral maturity rises. These ideas 
were partly supported by the data in this study. For the total 
sample, the men alone, and the wcmen alone there was no significant 
relationship between the "care/[esponsibili ty" orientation and level 
of moral maturity. :!his was not true of the "rights/justice" 
orientation. - RIGHTS soore for the total sllll'ple and the men 
alone were significantly correlated with Moral Maturity. For 
neither of these groups, however, was moral maturity a significant 
predictor of the "rights" orientation. ibe second part of the 
------~~-- --~------~ -- -------------
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study was designed to extend our knowledge about relationship 
between moral reasoning and sex-role orientation. This was done by 
concentrating on the sociological measures of sex-role orientation 
and decision-making in the societal domain (TOmeh, 1978). Six null 
hypotheses were used in this part of the study. 
A test of hypothesis four revealed no difference between the 
sex-role preferences of men and women. As was expected when using a 
highly educated sample, neither sex was significantly more "modern'' 
in their beliefs about the preferred behaviors for men and women. 
Hypothesis five was used to test the sex-role researchers' 
suggestion that sex-role orientation will become more "modern11 as 
one moves toward higher levels of moral maturity. The data in this 
study partially supported this assertion. There was a significant 
positive relationship between level of moral maturity and sex-role 
orientation for the sample as a whole. But when broken down into 
the two groups, the results remained true for the men but not for 
the women. 
Hypothesis six was designed to extend the knowledge about the 
relationship between moral orientation and decision-making in the 
moral domain (Lyons, 1983), to decision-making in the societal 
domain (Turiel, 1978). It was used to examine the difference in 
moral maturity between those who used a "care/responsibility" moral 
orientation when making decisions about sex-role preferences and 
those who used a "rights/justice" approach. The tests revealed no 
significant differences for all subjects or for the women alone. 
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For the men alone, however, the care group was significantly higher 
in moral maturity than the rights group. 
Hypothesis seven was designed to examine the difference be-en 
the "care" and "rights" orientations and sex-role orientation. '1'he 
tests revealed that a higher concern for either DDral orientation 
was significantly associated with a concern for more "modern" sex-
role preferences. 'l'hese same results were not obtained when the two 
groups were analyzed separately. For the women, the results were 
similar to those of the total group. Both orientations were 
significantly related to more "nontraditional" sex-role preferences. 
Data from the men showed no significant relationship be-en either 
of the two moral orientations and sex-role orientation. 
Hypothesis eight was also used to examine decision-making in 
the societal domain. It examined the relationship be-.n mral 
orientation measured by looking at moral dilemmas (CARE and RIGHTS 
scales) and moral orientation used in decisions about the social 
convention of sex-role orientation. A test of the data revealed no 
difference between those using the "care" or "rights" moral 
orientation in making decisions about sex-role orientation, in the 
moral orientation used in eypothetical moral dilemmas. 
- ninth eypothesis examined the relationship be-en the sex 
of the respondent and the moral orientation used in decision-making 
about sex-role preferences (societal domain). For this sample, 
there was no significant relationship be-.n the sex of the 
respondent and the moral orientation they used in making decisions 
about sex-role preferences. 
Implications for Moral Reasoning Research 
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The results of this study have several implications for the 
study of moral reasoning. Gilligan has suggested, in contrast to 
Kohlberg, that there are two paths to moral maturity. one path 
follows the development of a concern centering on issues of care and 
responsibility, while the other centers on a concern for issues of 
justice and individual rights. She also suggested that, although 
these are differences of theme rather than by sex, each sex, as a 
result of the socialization process, tends to adopt one approach 
over the other, and that the orientation adopted is not altered by 
the movement toward higher levels of moral reasoning. 'Ihese ideas 
were only partially supported by the findings of this study. 
There was no relationship found between the sex of the 
respondent and their moral orientation. It may be that it is a 
difference of theme and not sex and the variables measured here were 
not appropriate to the study of this distinction. It may also be, 
as Pratt and Royer ( 1982) suggested, that the two orientations are 
not general across moral issues (or across domains) or that the 
orientations are only 11moderately distinct patterns of reasoning 11 
(p. 203). The high correlation between the two RIGHTS and CARE 
scores in this study seems to support this possibility. As there 
have been a number of studies that have supported the existence of 
the two moral orientations, further research is needed to explore 
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the strength of the distinction between the orientations and to 
discover factors other than sex that may contribute to the adoption 
and use of the two orientations. 
The study partly supported Gilligan's contention that moral 
orientation is not altered by the movement toward higher levels of 
moral maturity. No significant relationship was found between level 
of moral maturity and the "care/responsibility" moral orientation, 
but this was not true for the ''rights/justice" orientation. More 
study is needed to test the consistency of this finding. The data 
did not support Gilligan's (1982) contention that women will be 
likely to reason from a position of care regardless of achievement 
levels or occupation. The women in this sample, though of a high 
level of achievement, were nearly equal in their concern for the two 
orientations, a characteristic that both Kohlberg (1984) and 
Gilligan ( 1982) predicted when the women had more experience. 
Lastly, there was no relationship between the sex of the 
respondents and their level of moral maturity. Although Gilligan 
has suggested that as a result of the use of a 11 Care" orientation, 
women have been judged to be on a lower level of moral maturity when 
measured by Kohlberg's scale, other researchers have found little 
support for this contention (Walker, 1984; Thoma (cited in Rest, 
1986)). 'lbe results of this study supported the findings of Walker 
and Thoma. There was no relationship between the two variables. It 
seems that a good case can be make for proceeding under the belief 
that sex is not a determining factor in the moral orientation or 
level of moral maturity reached by an individual. 
Implications for Sex-Role Research 
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The most striking implication for sex-role research was the 
finding of a significant relationship between level of moral 
maturity and sex-role orientation. In developing their scales sex-
role researchers (Osmond & Martin, 1975; Scanzoni, 1975; TOmeh, 
1978) aligned 11modern" sex-role beliefs with higher moral thinking 
because they indicated an acceptance of greater role flexibility and 
a greater concern for individualistic interests. This implies that 
a rise in moral maturity will be accompanied by support for 
"nontradi tiona!" sex-role beliefs. Such thinking was supported by 
this study, notably by the data from the men but not from the women. 
The finding of a significant relationship between both the 
"care/responsibility" and the "rights/justice" orientations and sex-
role orientation may also indicate support for the sex-role 
researchers' thinking. It may be that higher levels of concern for 
moral issues, regardless of the orientation used, parallels higher 
levels of moral maturity in general and thus would also be related 
to more "modern" sex-role beliefs. Further research is needed to 
test the connection between the strength of the concern for moral 
orientation and moral maturity and how these might be related to 
sex-role orientation. 
As noted earlier, Turiel ( 1978) has proposed a different 
approach to the study of moral reasoning and sex-role orientation. 
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He suggested that sex-role beliefs were social conventions and a 
part of the societal domain and not moral imperatives. Following 
his reasoning, the relationship between moral maturity and sex-role 
orillntation may be the result of the parallel development of the 
two domains and not the result of any causal connection between the 
two concepts. His thinking may be supported by the finding of no 
significant relationship between moral orientation and moral 
orientation used in decision-making about sex-role preferences. If 
Turiel is correct, this finding may have occurred because moral 
orientatil'm was being measured in two different domains. The CARE 
and RIGHTS scales measured reactions to moral dilemmas (moral 
domain) while the DEC scale examined decisions about social 
conventions (societal domain). More research is needed to further 
study whether sex-role beliefs are truly part of a separate domain 
and, if so, what relationships exist between the different domains. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were limitations to this study that should be noted. 
Several of these deal with the nature of the sample and its 
selection. First, the sample under study was very homogeneous. 'Ihe 
subjects were all well educated, nearly all white, and all from a 
similar cultural background. As discussed in the research 
procedure, these sample characteristics were chosen to allow the 
testing of specific suggestions that have been made about moral 
reasoning. Although this was accomplished in the study, the 
selective nature of the sample limited the ability of the tests to 
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measure difference in the subjects (limited variability) and limited 
the generalizability of the findings to other groups. Future 
research should test these same concepts with groups that are less 
well educated, from a variety of cultural backgrounds, and from more 
than one race. Second, the sample size, especially for the men, 
must be considered. As a result of the common problem of getting 
subjects to return questionnaires, the sample size was smaller than 
planned. It was especially difficult to get men to cooperate. This 
situation also points to a third problem, the nonrandom and 
possibly self- selective nature of the sample. As volunteers were 
used as subjects and the return rate for those initially stating a 
willingness to participate was 40%, it is possible that the results 
from this sample were nonrepresentative of what would have been 
obtained from a truly random sample of individuals. 
one other aspect of the study that must be considered here was 
the adequacy of the instnunents used to gather the data. The Sex-
Role Orientation and Maturity of Moral Judgement scales were well 
tested and recognized as valid measures of the two concepts. The 
other two scales were not as well established. The scale used to 
measure moral orientation was based on Rest's Defining Issues Test, 
but it was an altered form of that test. The last instrument was 
developed from Tomeh' s scale but the scoring of the items was 
altered from Tomeh's original scale. Although the items on the 
moral orientation scale were checked for face validity and the 
scoring of the altered Tomeh scale was checked by measuring the 
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interjudge reliability of three judges, IIDre testing and greater 
refinement of these instruments is needed to assure their adequacy 
for collecting the desired information. 
conclusion 
It was hoped that this stUIIY would both test some recently 
developed notions about moral development and its relationship to 
sex-role orientation and extend the knowledge currently available 
into some untested areas. A apecific goal waa to move the focus of 
the research away from the much studied psychological measures of 
sex-role orientation and into the sociological measures of the 
social conventions of sex-role orientation. It was also hoped that 
the stUIIY would stimulate further research on this timely and 
important topic of studY. The data from this studY revealed several 
areas in which there were notable differences between the men and 
women on the variables investigated. Further attention to such 
differences and their correlates is needed to tmc:over the 
complexities of the relationships between the sexes and the beliefs 
they hold. 
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RESEI\RCH PROJECT 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important 
research project. 'lbese questionnaires are aiDEd at understanding 
how people think about social problems. ~!here are no 11 right" 
answers in the way that there are right answers to math problems. 
we wtJUld like you to tell us what you think about several important 
social issues. Please answer the questions presented in the way 
they seem right to you. '!'he questionnaires are anonymous and your 
answers to the questions will be completely confidential. Each 
participant will be assigned an identification number, and this 
information will be kept in a locked file. No real names will be 
attached to any data that we collect. The data collected will be 
analysed to find the average for the whole group. No one will see 
your individual answers. Your participation in this study is 
completely voluntary. You should feel free to discontinue 
participation at any time or to decline to answer specific 
questions. Your participation will have no affect on your final 
class evaluation. 
Please check the appropriate answer: 
1. Sex male female 
2. Age 
3. Race 
4. Citizenship united states Other 
5. Country in which you have lived the majority of your life: 
11ni ted states Other 
6. College Major----------------
- ·---···-- --------
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QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
DIRECTIONS: For the following 15 statements - read the statement 
and assume that it has been made by a person with whom you are 
having a conversation. Then, in the space below each 
statement, indicate what your reaction would most likely be. 
1. The FBI has its hands tied in many cases because of. the 
unreasonable opposition of some people to wire tapping. 
2. (Black Speaker) Even after graduating from high school I can't 
find work. Yet I know many white dropouts who have good jobs. 
3. The city is going to repeat what has been done in many other 
cities by building a superhighway right through the slum 
district. Many apartments will be torn down and many people 
will be forced out. 
4. Some boys have it easy. They go to college and get out of the 
draft, and we get sent to Vietnam. 
5. I told Jack my idea for the new project. He took it to the 
boss and got the credit. 
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6. The new housing law is unfair. Why should I be forced to take 
in tenants that I find undesirable? 
7. In many medical laboratories experiments get performed on live 
animals and very little care is taken to minimize pain. 
8. I read another story today about a girl who was refused an 
abortion in a hospital. An incompetent doctor gave her an 
illegal abortion and she died. 
9. I think it is urmecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners 
on death row for so long, and to make the execution such a 
ritual. 
10. The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend 
and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the 
foundations of our society. 
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11. A powerful group representing hunters and gun manufacturers is 
holding up a gun control law that the majority of the people in 
this cotu1try want. 
12. The goverrunent shouldn't have passed the medicare bill. Why 
should we pay other people's bills? 
13. Several policemen were called into a slum area to break up a 
street fight but when they arrived the local residents threw 
bricks at them from the windows. 
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14. During last years ghetto riots a shop owner saw a boy jump out 
of the broken window of his store with a television set. The 
man shot the boy, who is now crippled as a result. 
15. 'Die police were rough when they broke up that crowd of students 
even though the students were parading without a peEDlit. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 4 
Directions: Please read the following statements taken from the 
previous questionnaire and give a statement explaining 
why you chose the answer that you did. 
1. In marriage, the wife and husband should share making major 
decisions. 
5. A married man's chief responsibility should be equally divided 
between his job and family. 
7. A mother of young children may want to work if it makes her 
personally happy. 
8. If the wife makes more money than the husband, it would not 
upset the balance of power. 
15. A married man should realize that his wife's career may 
interfere with his career. 
